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List 1, Sheet 1

~
rom Supreme Court of
~ 0 i ~g inia {Miller}
v.

Hardesty {Tax Commissioner
of W.
Va.}
1.

SUMMARY:

State/Civil

Timely

Appt argues that imposing the West VIr-

ginia business and occupations tax, which is a gross receipts
tpx, on the sales of three of its divisions violates the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause.
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2.

FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW:

West Virginia imposes

gross receipts tax on wholesale sales.

However, a manufactur-

~

er who manufactures within West Virginia is exempt from this
tax.

'--------------~....----------

--

Appt

is an Ohio corporation that is qualified to do

business in West Virginia.
divisions.

It is divided into a number of

The Mining Division engages in extensive coal min-

----

Two of

the other divisions, t
Group manufactured goods outside of West Virginia.

These two

- ---

groups had no sales offices in West Virginia, _b..ut sent salesman to West Virginia.

The salesmen relayed orders to the out

of state office which had the authority to accept or reject
the orders.

Goods were shipped into the state by common car?

rier, with title passing to the common ' car

the out of
products

division maintained a sales office in West ~Virginia.

However,

one of the divisions _products, metal buildings, was sold exclusively by a franchisee.

Appt brought this action, contend-

ing that the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause forbid
<'1
the application of West Virginia's 6usiness and occupation tax

-

on the sales of metal buildings and on the sales by the Steel
•:::;'

Group and the Union Wire Rope Group.
The Tax Commissioner rejected appt' s claims.

It held

that the activities of the salesmen in soliciting orders and

.

.

in checking on the buyers' satisfaction created a sufficient
nexus to permft the taxation of the sales by the Steel and

-

Wire Groups.

3 -

It determined that appt's close cooperation with

its franchisees created a suffiecient nexus to tax the sale of
the Steel Buildings.
The ~

rcuit Court reversed.

It held that the activi-

ties of the traveling salesmen were insufficient to establish
the required nexus.

The court held that the Metal Buuildings

Division had no physical presence in West Virginia.
it had an insufficient nexus.

Therefore

The court concluded that impo-

sition of the tax would violate the Commerce and Due Process
Clauses.
The ~

It held

reme Court of West Virginia reversed.

that the Commerce and Due Process Clauses are satisfied if a
business has a 1 ubstantial nexu~ with the taxing state, there
--,

is a

rational

relationship between the tax imposed and the

benefits reaped from activities in the state, and the tax is
not discrinmintaory or unfairly apportioned.
The court held
activiti~

that it could consider all of

etr' s

in West Virginia, including its coal mining activi-

ties, in determining whether the required nexus had been established.

The court recognized that in Norton Co v. Depart-

ment of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534

(1951)

this court

held that a corporation could avoid taxation if it could show
that

the

"particular

transactions

are dissociated

local business and intertstate in character."

from

the

However,

the

court concluded that subsequent cases such as General Motors
•Corp v.

Washington,

377

U.S.

436

(1964);

Standard Pressed

Steel Co. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975);

- 4 -

(,,,

and Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S.
(1980)

had weakened the Norton test.

207

In General Motors, ac-

cording to this Court examined a gross receipts tax and, according to the West Virginia Court,
ness activities conducted by G.M.
the

precise

business

Pressed Steel,

done

by

the Court found

examined the total busiin Washington, rather than

each

division.

In

Standard

the presence of a single in

state employee who made poossible the_continued relationship
between Standard and its in-state customer to be a sufficient
nexus.

Finally, ~

Exxon, the court permitted an income tax

to be imposed on production and refining when only marketing
activities took place in the taxing state.

This

Court based

the state's power to tax all teh activities on a finding that
Exxon was a unitary business.

The court concluded that under

these cases, the Norton rule did not apply to a unitary business.

Thus, the court could consider all of the activities of

the corporation to establish the requisite nexus. The court
concluded that the requisiste nexus was established.
The court also rejected petr 's claim that the tax was
discriminatory because it contained an exemption for in-state
manufacturers.

First, the exemption was available to an out

of state corporation that manufactured in West Virginia. Second,

in-state manufacturers were required to pay a tax that

petr was not required to pay.

Therefore the tax did not dis-

criminate.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Appt argues that the decision in

the instant case conflicts with this court's holding in Nor-

- 5 -

ton,

supra.

the

Other

validity of

state courts ahve continued to recognize

the principle enunciated

in Norton,

that

a

corporation that is doing business in a state may avoid taxation on

a

transactions

transaction

if

it

are dissociated

can
from

show
the

that

the

particular

local activity.

See,

e.g., Alaska v. Sears & Roebusck, 660 P.2d 1188 (Alaska 1983);
Chicago Bridge
2d

814,

&

Iron Co. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 98 Wash.

petition

for

cert

filed,

No.

82-1848

(1983).

The

cases relied on by the West Virginia Corut did not weaken Norton.

In General Motors, this Court explicitly recognized that

Norton stated the governing principle for gross receipt taxes.
Further,
the

in both General Motors and Standard Pressed Steel,

in-state activities had a greater nexus with the out · of

state actvities than in the instant case.

The West Virginia

Court's

Exxon

reliance on Exxon was misplaced.

income tax.

involved an

The difficulties in determining each state's fair

share of net income justify the unitary concept in income taxes.

There is no such dificulty in applying a gross receipts

tax.

Even

if

the

in-state solicitations were held

to be a

sufficient nexus, many of the transactions were the result of
out of state solicitations.

Under American Oil Co. v. Neil,

380 U.S. 451 (1965) these transactions may not be taxed.

Fi-

nally the tax is discriminatory because it exempts the sales
of

in-state manufacturers.

That appt could avail

itself of

the same exemption by moving to West Virginia is irrelevant.
• The tax burden imposed on interstate sales is greater since
the state in which the manufacturing occurs may also impose a

-

tax on the manufacturer.
may be taxed
taxed once.

6 -

Thus, an out of state manufacturer

twice where the in-state manufacturer

is only

For this reason, the West Virginia tax violates

the commerce clause.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Appt has a strong argument that the
I

l

~,

West Virginia Court applied
the wrong
.,...~,
- test in evaluating the
. .

constitutionality of applying its tax in this case.

As appt

notes, under Norton, a corporations i~-state activities must
be related to the transaction that the state seeks to tax.

I

do not think that General Motors can fairly be read as abandoning this rule.
of

corporate

Although the court did refer to the "bundle

activities"

in determining

whether

there were

sufficient in-state contacts, the court also specifically held
that the taxpayer had not met his burden of showing that the
in-state activities were dissociated from the taxed transactions.

This Court's ff ailure to ( separate ~

ities of ~

analyzeJ the activ-

division at certain points in the opinion can be

explained by the fact that the actvi ties were in some cases

(

similar,

1

and

in other

cases,

interrelated.

Additionaly,

in

American Oil Co. v. Neil, 380 U.S. 451 (1965), which was decided after General Motors,

this court explicitly relied on

the

to

dissociation

principle

invalidate

an

excise

tax.

Standard Pressed Steeel did not purport to change the rule.
Rather, it merely relied on General Motors.
Appt 2:,..s also correct that the problems invloved in de, I

,,

'termining a stat'e fair proprotion of an income tax are different from those involved in making the same determination

I

. •

\

If
,\
about a gross receipts tax.

ton.

Thus, Exxon did not overrule Nor-

Additionally, although none of the state cases relied on

by appt

found

that a taxpayer had shown dissociation,

they

continue to adhere to Norton as stating the governing rule.
Assuming that the transactinos that were solicited out
of state were unrelated to the in-state activities, appt is
correct that under Neil, supra, they may not be taxed.

'-

----------=~

Appt's discrimination argument is weaker.

As the West

Virginia Court noted, that state actually taxes goods manufactured out of state at a lower rate than those manufactured instate.

Had West Virginia chosen to impose the gross receipts

tax on

in state manufacturers

and

lower

its manufacturing

tax, petr could not raise his discrimination argument

Yet the

difference between this hypothetical tax scheme and the tax
scheme actually utilized is merely one of form.

Additionally,

essentially, appt's argument is that there is a risk of multiple taxation. However, the burden is on the taxpayer to demonstrate that there is multiple taxation.

See Standard Steel,

supra, at 563: General Motors, supra, at 449.

Appt's invoca-

tion of a possibility of multiple taxation is not sufficient
to carry that burden.
.

This court has noted probable jurisdiction in Bacchus

~ Imports, Inc. v. Freitas, 656 P.2d
~ case deals with the related issue of

724

(Hawaii 1983).

This

whether Hawaii may exempt

from its excise tax on liquors certain liquors that are produced in Hawaii.

However, I do not think that this case needs

- 8 -

to be held for Bacchus.

Unlike West Virginia, Hawaii does

not have a compensating tax on local manufacturers.
I recommed calling for a response.
There is no response
There is a motion to consider this case in tandem with
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. State of Washington Department of
Revenue, No. 82-1848
October 6, 1983
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83-295 Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty
MEMO TO FILE:
This is a brief memo to refresh my recollection.
The case is important and I will need to spend more time
on the briefs as well as have the views of my clerk.
'!he Facts
Armco challenges the validity of West Virginia's
business

and

occupation

The

tax.

amount of

the

tax is

computed on the basis of "gross receipts" from the sale
tangible

property

within

the

three types of business in the state.
its

wholesale

sales

are

at

Armco

state.

in

In this case only
These

issue.

engages

of

are

described

below.
The
engage

in

tax also

is imposed upon nonresidents that

manufacturing

and

mining

within

the

state.

Neither of these activities is directly at issue.

Armco

o,,Jl-

concedes that its cold mining is subject to the t ~

d,.... _.

this has been paid.
The
summarized
divisions

facts

on
of

p.

the

with
4

of

respect

to

Armco's

company make

sales

wholesale
brief.
in

the

sales

Three
state:

is

group
the

steel group, wire rope group, and Metal Products division.

All of the sales made in the state by these divisions had
"the following attributes in common":
There
state;

(ii)

were

no

(i)

no

manfacturing

salesmen

resident

facilities

sales or other off ices in the state;

there;

(iv)

in

the

(iii)

no

no inventories

of the products of these three divisions were maintained;
(v)

all orders were accepted or rejected outside of the

state either in West Virginia or Ohio;

(vi)

the products

were shipped by common carrier from outside of the state,
and title was transferred "to the purchaser" at the time
of

delivery

to

the

carrier;

and

(vii)

Armco

did

not

was

the

install, service or repair any of these products.
The

one

activity

within

the

state

solicitation of orders by a total of seven salesmen.

The

Metal Products Division sold only to two franchise dealers
and there was no solicitation within the state.
products
separate

and

wire

salesmen

rope
for

products

each

type

were

But steel

solicited,

product.

The

with

salesmen

worked out of offices in other states and did not maintain
residences in West Virginia.
Armco's
office

in

substantial

West

Metal

Products

Virginia,

amount

of

coal

and,

Division
of

mining

did

course,
and

sales

have
it

did

an
a

business

within

the

In

state.

addition

to

the

tax

on

the coal

activities having been paid, this also was true as to the
Metal Products Division (Br. p. 5).

Armco's Argument
It

relies

on

the

due

process

and

commence

clauses and with respect to each argues that there was an
absence of a sufficient "nexus" between Armco's activities
with respect to the divisons at issue, and its activities
in West Virginia.
Due
support

Process.

state

taxation:

"nexus" between the
state and

Two

(b)

requirements must be met

(a)

a

"minimal

connection"

to
or

interstate activities and the taxing

a "rational relationship between the income

attributed to the state and the intrastate values of the
enterprise."
447

U.S.

Exxon Corp.

207,

Taxation, 445

219-20;

u.s.

Commerce
activities

to

v. Wisconsin Dept.
Mobil

Oil

Corp.

of Revenue,

v.

Comm'r

of

425, 436-37 (1980).

Clause.

which

the

This
tax

requires

applies

that

must

have

the
a

substantial nexus with the state, the tax must be "fairly
apportioned",
provided

by

"be
the

fairly

GJ

state",

and

related
not

to

the

discriminate

services

~

against

.

.•.

interstate commerce.

Armco relies principally on Complete

Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279.
The
slightest

brief

indication

argues
[in

that

the

"there

record]

is

that

[not]

the

sales

the
in

question were anything other than "disassociated" with the
company's local business activities in West Virginia.

(p.

13, et seq.)

Armco relies heavily on Norton Co.

v.

Dept. of

Revenue of Illinois, 340 u.s. 534 (1951) that held that
for

gross

receipts

taxes,

the

nexus

test

is

whether

"particular transactions are disassociated with the local
busines".

The

argument

is

made

that

the

Divisions

of

. . . """"' at issue
Armco operated separately, and that the D1v1s1os
~

in this case were entirely

"disassociated"

from the

two

divisions coal and Metal Products that maintained offices
within the state.
Armco's
gross

Commerce

~
i\ tax

discriminates

Clause

argument

against

is

interstate

that

the

commerce.

Discrimination exists because intrastate sales of locally
made products are exempt from the wholesale gross receipts
tax.

Thus

wholesale

sales

made

in

interstate

commerce

were subject to a tax not imposed on wholesale sales made
on intrastate commerce.

The State's Arguments
On the due process issue, the state argues that
the state may levy a tax on interstate business if there
is a "minimal connection" between the taxing state and the
income producing activities.
437

u. s.

~ansit

267

spoke

connection".
sales

(I

(1968).

of
The

the

note

here

requirement

state

representatives

Moorman Mfg. Co.

argues
who

that
for

that

visited

v.

Blair,

Complete
a

each
West

Auto

"substantial
of

the

seven

Virginia

"were

available to advise propspective customers of Armco's line
of

products,

and

to

make

recommendations

and

provide

advice concerning the customer's specific product needs".
Also,

after

sales

consummted,

were

sales

the

representatives made follow-up calls to ascertain whether
the customer was satisfied.

This activity satisfied the

"minimal nexus" requirement.
The
Commerce

state

Clause

has

a

issue,

little

more

particularly

trouble
in

view

with

the

of

the

discrimination against interstate sales noted above.

The

state therefore relies on the "unitary business" concept
that

recent

decisions

of

this

Court

apportionment~ot net incomif

have

applied

to

In support of this

argument, the state views all of Armco's busincess in West

Virginia

(including

constituting

a

the

coal

"unitary"

and

Metal

business

divisions)

operation

in

as

West

Virginia.
Armco

answers

concept has never

by

contending

that

Corp.

v.

contained
Franchise

unitary

been applied to a gross receipts tax.

Armco relies on the description of the
principle"

the

"unitary business

in last Term's opinion in Container
Tax

Board

(WJB 's

opinion) •

Armco's

brief continues as follows:
"The
unitary
business
principle
is
reconcilable with the constitutional prohibition
against
state
taxation
of
extraterritorial
values only by reason of factors ~ec~liar to net
income taxes.
The impossioility of allocating a
taxpayer Is' total net income a"irectly a-;--ong two
or more srcH:t!s 1J!d '\:ts' "thE!" _practice of defining
total net income re a IT zed by_ .. tne • faxpayer 's
unitary !Susiness~ and tnen apportioning '"that
tot'a1 net '"income among the states by formulae.
N o ~ u l t y is presented by a nonapportioned gross receipts tax such as the West
Virginia tax imposed on Armco."

* * *
'!he above summary obviously is deficient in many
respects, and I will have to have some help particularly
with respect

to the cases most nearly relevant.

I

will

not want a long memo from the clerk, but I would like a
summary one if time should be available.

jen 04/10/84

r
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

No. 83-297
Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty

Joseph Neuhaus

April 10, 1984

Question Presented
Does West Virginia's gross

receipts tax on wholesale sales

violate the Due Process or Commerce Clauses where

(a)

it is ap-

plied to an out-of-state company's divisions that sell to West
Virginia

buyers

through

nonresident salesmen,

manufacturing companies are exempt?

and

(b)

resident

l

No. 83-297:

page 2.

Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty

Summary of Facts

&

Decision Below

For the tax years at issue, Armco, an Ohio corporation, had a
variety of operations in West Virginia as to which it concedes
taxability.

This

litigation concerns

three product

lines

that

were sold in West Virginia separately from Armco's other operations.

The products of

the ~ire rope and 'steel divisions were

sold via orders solicited by a total of seven nonresident salesmen, each of whom visited the state once or twice a month.
./ metal

buildings

division

sold

its

products

via

two

The

franchised

dealers.
The state supreme court upheld the application of the state's
gross receipts tax to the wholesale sales of these three divisions.

/T)

----

It hel~hat Armco should be considered a ~ni tary busi-

ness "I for purposes of determining whether there was a sufficient
"nexus" with the state to allow taxation of the company's sales
generally.
nexus.

The court held that, so considered, there was such a

In addition, the court held th~

he tax was fairly ap-

-

portioned because there was a rational relationship between the
tax and the benefits and services provided to Armco's
tivities in the state.
not

Finally, the court . held th

unconstitutionally discriminate

against

3

~

ac-

t h e tax d1"d

interstate commerce

simply because it exempted in-state manufacturers.

These manu-

facturers were subject to a compensating, and much higher, manufacturing tax.

No. 83-297:

page 3.

Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty

Discussion
1.

Nexus.

-

There is a nexus test under both the Due Process

and Commerce Clauses.

The first question to consider is whether

the taxpayer's contacts with the state are to be considered in
toto, or whether the contacts with respect to the sales of each
product should be considered separately.

While the court below

recognized that this Court had specified the latter view in Nor-

ton

Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 340

u.s.

534, 537 (1951), it thought ~

that more recent cases had abandoned that position.
was

u.s.

mis taken.

The

Court

in General Motors

v.

In this it

Washington,

377

436, 441 (1964), specifically quoted the test that a taxpay-

er is entitled to show that some of its business is "dissociated"
from the local activities that are the claimed nexus.

The Court

appears to have held that no such dissociation was possible, and
upheld

the tax.

The Court in Standard Steel Co.

v. Washington

Revenue Dept., 419 U.S. 560 (1975), the other case primarily relied

upon

question,

below,

had

no occasion to consider

since only a

the dissociation

single set of sales was at issue.

The

Court in any case merely relied on GM.
The court below also relied on "unitary" business case
further support for

its conclusion.

for

These cases are essentially

irrelevant to a gross receipts tax for two reasons.

First, the

unitary business concept as such has no application where there
is no formula that is applied to the combined income in order to
divide it up among the various jurisdictions.
la he~e.

There is no formu-

West Virginia allocates various taxable units by refer-

ence to what was sold.

That is, the state is perfectly willing

to tax the transactions at issue here as it finds them.

.•

i~1:::

Thus,

No. 83-297:

Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty

there

need

is

no

artificially

page 4.

to combine

the

sales of various

products in order to apportion them to the correct category.
second,

and

related reason,

is that there is no sensible reason
It

to impose a unitary apportionment s

.

----

than net income.

....__..__,

readily

The

\~

-

on transactions rather

The location and price of the transactions are

identified--at

least,

the

transactions

occur between entities that are not commonly owned.

Unitary ap-

as

here,

where

portionment formulas are inherently rough and approximate devices
to be used only when the realities of the market do not reliably
identify the liable taxpayer.
I also do not find persuasive the state's argument here that
Complete Auto Transit,
made

the

Norton

Inc.

v.

Brady,

test obsolete.

The

430

' t

nexus

u.s.

""
test

274
is

(1977),
intended

has
to

~
,..
'

'!;fM-4<.~

'-.__..,

ensure that a taxpayer pays for the benefits and services prov id.
r'

~ ed~

~

e.

The fact that the taxpayer does completely un-

related business in the state may have nothing to do with whether
it derives benefits in making the sales at issue here.

There is

nothing in the case of a gross receipts tax that prevents a "pay
as you go" approach, so the state should not be allowed to use a
far rougher method.

In short, the Norton test makes sense in the

case of a gross receipts tax.
Thus, we must look to the separate connections of each transaction, or set of transactions, involved here to see if the consti tutional

tests are

satisfied.

As you noted in your memo to

the file of April 6, it has been said that the Due Process Clause
imposes
test

is

a

"minimal connection"
frequently

stated

as

test,

while

requiring

a

the Commerce Clause
"substantial

nexus."

1-4--/-.

No. 83-297:
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page 5.

This Court, however, has not distinguished between the two tests,
and the Court's opinion in ~

ntainer Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,

(1983), said that both Clauses were satis- ~ ' f

103 s.ct.

2933,

fied by a

"minimal connection"

2940

~:;.~

test.

See also National Bellas

~

~

Inc. v. Dept. of ; :enue, ~ 6 u.s. 753, 756 (1966)

Hess.

~f

that the two tests are "similar" and quoting the "minimum connec-~ ·
tion" test).

The question thus is whether the sales here, accom-

plished by nonresident salesmen and independent franchisees, satisfy this test.
The cases on the sufficiency of connections in this context
appear to be arrayed as follows.
may

not

be

imposed

on

purely

Gross receipts and use taxes

mail

order

business.

National

Bellas Hess v. Dept. of Revenue, 386 u.s. 753 (1967)
Norton Co.

v. Dept. of Revenue,

receipts tax).
Of

-----------

Standard
(1975)

---------L

(1951)

(gross

Co.

contractors,

v.

Washington

are

subject

Revenue

-----

,'-

presence by persons ' resident

independent

Steel

534, 539

On the other hand, businesses that have any kind

solicitation £E

including

340 U.S.

(use tax);

in the state,

to

Dept. ,

such
419

taxes.

U.S.

560

(single employee to serve large customer); General Motors

v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1963)

(district managers and service

representatives were residents); Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207,
211

(1960)

the gates
rather
that

(independent contractors--contrary
to a stampede of tax avoidance") •

old case,

McLeod

v.

Dilworth Co. ,

rule

"would open

In between is one

322 U.S.

j.s very close to this one in certain respects.

327

( 1944) ,

The Court

held sales solicited by traveling salesmen in Arkansas for a Tennessee corporation were immune from the Arkansas sales tax.

No. 83-297:
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In my view, McLeod is a questionable precedent.

----------.....,

of Washington as

amicus

distinction between

€9

Complete Auto Transit

relied

As the State

argues,

that case

heavily on a

an@

taxes that makes no sense after

(and made little sense before).

The dis-

tinction appears to have been based on the idea that a sales tax
reaches a completely interstate transaction, while a use tax taxes something after

u.s.,

at 329,

interstate

it has come to rest

That distinction is irrelevant now that

330-331.

commerce

can

be

------------

taxed directly.

practical rather than legal matter,
distinguish

See 322

in the state.

between employees

or

In addition,

as

a

it seems to me senseless to

agents who have

homes

in

the

It can make no constitutional dif-

state and those who do not.

ference that Armco operates through seven salesmen who spend part
of

their

time

in

the state instead of one salesman who spends

most or all of his time there.

Thus, I would hold that the sales

through franchisees are subject to tax under Scripto,

and that

the

Standard

sales

through

salesmen

are

subject

to

tax

under

Steel and GM.
While the question need not be reached in this case, I might
add that I also question the wisdom of the line drawn in Norton
and National Bellas, which held that purely mail order sales were
exempt from local taxes.
pays

for

the

benefits

If the idea is to ensure that a seller

an.f

services it derives,

it seems to me

that mail order businesses derive substantial benefits from being
able to sell to residents in a state.

They use the state's roads

and communications facilities, and generally accept checks drawn
on the state's banks.

In addition, they derive indirect benefits

No. 83-297:

page 7.
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from the fact that their buyers live and are employed in a civilized and stable society and economy.
den on

interstate commerce

I will admit that the bur-

is somewhat greater when businesses

whose only contact with the state is mail order sales are taxed
than when,

as

in this case,

taxes are laid on businesses which

have entered the state in a more substantial and physical fashion.

As a practical matter, however, I doubt the burden is very

great

in the former case, at least where there is some minimum

threshold of sales.
82-485 (3/20/84)
is

Cf.

Keeton v.

Hustler Magazine,

Inc.,

No.

(magazine circulation of 10,000 to 15,000 copies

sufficient for

personal

(Also analogous are

j ur isd iction) .

state products liability laws that hold a manufacturer liable for
any injury done in the state.)
far easier:

In any event, the present case is

here the taxpayer has physically and systematically

entered the state in order to serve the local market.
this provides a

nexus

that

I think

is sufficient under the Due Process

and Commerce Clause for the taxes laid here.
2.

Discrimination.

Under the Commerce Clause a tax may not,

at least on its face, discriminate against interstate commerce in
favor

of

intrastate commerce.

That is,

a state may not tax a

transaction more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it
occurs entirely in the state.

The tax here violates that princi-

ple, and therefore should be invalidated.
On its face,

the tax here does discriminate against inter-

state ,commerce, because it exempts wholesale sales made by West
Virginia ma~u! actu..re..LJ> while requiring payment on sales of goods

...

~

originating out of state.

West Virginia's argument that its man-

No. 83-297:
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ufacturers are already subject to a much higher tax is unpersuaIf Ohio imposes a like tax on its manufacturers--which it

sive.

has every right

to do--then Armco and other

interstate sellers

will pay both a manufacturi~g tax and a wholesale tax while resident sellers will only pay the manufacturing tax.

To illustrate,

if Ohio were to adopt the same scheme, then an interstate seller

r

would pay the manufacturing tax of .88% and the gross receipts or - 4 ~
.25%; a purely intrastate seller would pay only the manufacturing
tax of .88% and would be exempt from the gross receipts tax.
West Virginia's answer to this is that Armco may not rely on
the

theoretical

possibility of

bearing a

heavier

aggregate tax

burden than its West Virginia competitors, but must prove actual
discriminatory

impact.

If

Ohio

or

the

other

states

in which

Armco has factories do not impose a manufacturing tax, the argument goes, then Armco is in fact ahead of the game.
The Court in Container Corp. v.

wrong test.
103 s.ct.

2933,

2942

This is the

Franchise Tax Bd.,

(1983), correctly stated the test as being

that the tax must have "internal consistency--that is the
must

be such

result"

that,

if applied

in no discrimination.

to every

jurisdiction,

See also id., at 2943.

[tax]

it would
Thus, one

asks whether the tax would result in discrimination against interstate commerce

if applied

in every state.

That this is the

right test is clear by a look at the alternatives: Armco should
not be required to burden the courts with a detailed examination
of the interrelated provisions of the tax code of every state in
which it operates to see whether it can show that West Virginia's
facially discriminatory tax will result in actual discrimination.

•

No. 83-297:
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West Virginia is wrong when it suggests that the rules laid
out above could be corrected by a merely formal change in the tax
structure.

It is true that the only change required would be to

reduce the manufacturing tax and apply the wholesale sales tax to
all sellers uniformly.
well,

would

not

But this scheme,

discriminate

against

if applied in Ohio as

interstate

commerce.

To

illustrate,

if the manufacturing tax in both Ohio and West Vir-

ginia were

reduced

by

gross receipts tax for

. 25% to

. 63% and the exemption from the

in-state manufacturers were removed, both

an interstate and an intrastate seller would pay the same aggregate tax--.63% to the state in which they manufacture and .25% to
the state in which they sell.
RECOMMENDATION:

Reverse

against interstate commerce.

because

the

tax

discriminates
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Joe
No. 83-297 Armco Inc. v. Hardesty

Re:

Here is a chambers draft of the opinion in this case.

In

line with your comments, I have deleted a footnote that described
the circuit court's opinion as construing the statute to avoid
unconstitutionality (the point was of marginal relevance) ~

I

have deleted the paragraph that discussed the possibility of
remedying the violation by splitting the manufacturer's tax.

The

citechecker and readers suggested some minor stylistic changes.
......

~-----........._

The most extensive change is in footnote 7, where I have
rewritten the discussion of the Caskey case.
changes are on pp. 2

&

4.

Other language
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In

this

appeal

I/

an Ohio corporation claims that West

Virginia's wholesale gross receipts tax, from which local
manufacturers are exempt, unconstitutionally discriminates
against

interstate

commerce.

We

agree

and

reverse

the

state court's judgment upholding the tax.

I

Appellant Armco Inc.

is an Ohio corporation qualified

to do business in West Virginia.
manufacturing
through

1975,

business

in

subdivisions.

and
the
West

selling
time

at

Virginia

steel
issue

Its primary business is
From

products.
here,

through

Armco

five

1970

customers

..

conducted

divisions

or

Two of these had facilities and employees

in the State, while the other three sold various products
to

,,

in

the

State

only

through

franchisees

nonresident traveling salesmen. 1

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

or

t

2.

West Virginia imposes a gross receipts tax on persons
engaged

in

the

w.

wholesale.

business

of selling

Va. Code §ll-13-2c

tangible property at

(1983) • 2

For the years

1970 through 1975 Armco took the position that the gross
receipts
through

tax could

not

franchisees

be

imposed

and

on

the

sales

it made

salesmen.

nonresident

In

1 The

company's Mining Division mined, cleaned, and
sold coal in the State, and part of the Metal Products
Division sold various construction and drainage products
through an office in the State staffed by three employees.
The Metal Products Division's metal buildings were sold in
the State exclusively by two franchised dealers resident
in the State.
The Steel Group and the Union Wire Rope
Group had no office in West Virginia but sold steel and
wire rope through nonresident traveling salesmen who
solicited sales from customers in the State.
2 For
provided:

the

years

1971

through

1975,

§ll-13-2c

"Upon every person engaging or continuing
within this State in the business of selling any
tangible property whatsoever, real or personal,
there is
hereby levied, and shall be
collected, a tax equivalent to fifty-five one
hundredths of one percent of the gross income of
the business, except that in the business of
selling at wholesale the tax shall be equal to
twenty-seven one hundredths of one percent of
the gross income of the business." 1971 w. Va.
Acts, ch. 169.
The tax on
1971. 1959

wholesale gross receipts
Va. Acts, ch. 167.

w.

was

• 25%

prior

to

I

3.

addition, because local manufacturers were exempt from the
tax,

see

§11-13-2, 3

id.,

discriminated

against

Armco

argued

interstate

that

commerce.

the

tax

After

a

hearing, the State Tax Commissioner, who is appellee here,
determined that the tax was properly assessed on the sales
at

issue,

and

that

discriminatory. 4
reversed,

holding

Armco

The
that

had

Circuit
t:aerQ-

not
Court

W« •

shown
of

the

Kanawha

tax

was

County
~

an- iRsu£f iG4:-ent .-, nexus

between the sales and the Sta ~ ~ ition of

3w.

Va. Code §11-13-2 provides an exemption for
persons engaged in the State in manufacturing or in
extracting natural resources, and selling their products.
For the years at issue here, it read as follows:
"[A] ny person exercising any privilege taxable
under sections two-a [extracting and producing
natural
resources
for
sale]
or
two-b
[manufacturing] of this article and engaging in
the business of selling his natural resources or
manufactured products to producers of natural
resources, manufacturers, wholesalers, jobbers,
retailers or commercial consumers for use or
consumption in the purchaser's business shall
not be requred to pay the tax imposed in section
two-c [§ll-13-2c] of this article." 1955 w. Va.
Acts, ch. 165: 1971 w. Va. Acts, ch. 169.
4 The
disputed
were a
question

Commissioner waived statutory penal ties on the
amount because he found that Armco's objections
"good faith effort to interpret a substantial
of law." App. to Juris. Statement 49a.

4.

the tax. 5
The West Virginia
the

circuit

(1983).

court

and

Supreme Court of Appeals
upheld

the

303

tax.

reversed

S.E.2d

706

Viewing all of Armco's activities in the State as

a "unitary business," the court held that the taxpayer had
a substantial nexus with the State and that the taxpayer's
total tax was fairly related to the services and benefits
provided
also

to Armco by

held

interstate
sales

in

that

the

commerce;
the

the
tax

State.
did

while

Id.,

not

local

State were exempt

at

714,

716.

It

discriminate

against

manufacturers

making

from

the gross

receipts

tax, they paid a much higher manufacturing tax. 6

Id., at

5 The court appears to have construed the statute to
avoid unconstitutionality.
See App. to Juris. Statement
26a.
6w. Va. Code §11-13-2b imposes a manufacturing tax
of .88% on the value of products manufactured in the
State. The value of the products is measured by the gross
proceeds derived from its sale.
If the product is
manufactured in part tiri'rout of State, the sale pr ice is
multiplied by that po\-£ion of the manufacturer's payroll
costs or total costs attributable to West Virginia.
As
• relevant here, the tax is imposed on "every person
engaging or continuing within this State in the business
of manufacturing, compounding or preparing for sale,
profit, or commercial use, •.. any article ••. substance
or
commodity."
Prior to 1971, the tax rate was .8%.
1967 w. Va. Acts, ch. 188; see 1971 w. Va. Acts, ch. 169.

5.

.•

716-717.
We noted probable
and now reverse.
does

discriminate

u.s.

jurisdiction,

(1983),

Since we hold that West Virginia's tax
unconstitutionally

against

interstate

commerce, we do not reach Armco's argument that there was
not a sufficient nexus between the State and the sales at
issue here to permit taxation of them.

II

It long has been established that the Commerce Clause
of

its

own

force

protects

Boston Stock Exchange v.
328

(1976);

Freeman v.

One aspect of
discriminate
interstate
332, n. 12.

free

element."

among

the States.

State Tax Comm'n, 429
Hewit,

this protection
between

trade

329 U.S.

249,

is

a

that

transactions
Boston

Stock

on

the

u.s.

252

318,

(1946).

State "may not
basis

Exchange,

of

some

supra,

at

That is, a State may not tax a transaction or

incident more

heavily when

it crosses

state

lines

than

issue

here

when it occurs entirely within the State.
On

its

face,

the

gross

receipts

appears to have just this effect.
two companies

selling

tax

at

The tax provides that

tangible property at wholesale

in

6.

West

Virginia

whether

the

will

be

treated

differently

depending

on

taxpayer conducts manufacturing in the State

or out of it.

Thus,

if the property was manufactured in

the State, no tax on the sale is imposed.

If the property

was manufactured out of the State and imported for sale, a
tax of

. 27%

is

imposed

Motors v. Washington,
J., dissenting)

on

the

377 U.S.

sale pr ice.

See General

436, 459 (1964)

(Goldberg,

(identical provision in Washington "on its

face, discriminated against interstate wholesale sales to
Washington purchasers for it exempted the intrastate sales
of locally made products while taxing the competing sales
of interstate sellers"); Columbia Steel Co.
wash. 2d 658, _ _, 197 P.2d 976, 979 (1948)
The

court

discrimination

below
in

was

favor

of
of

the
local,

v.

State,

30

(same).

view

that

no

intrastate

such

commerce

occurred because taxpayers manufacturing in the State were
subject
This

to

view

Armco

a

higher

is mistaken.

cannot

manufacturing
competitors.
759

far

(1981),

be
tax

tax of

• 88% of the sale pr ice.

The gross

deemed

a

sales

tax

"compensating

imposed

on

its

imposed on

tax"
West

for

the

Virginia

In Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 758the Court

refused

to consider

a

tax on the

first use in Louisiana of gas brought in from out of State

7.

to be a complement of a severance tax in the same amount

7?

imposed on gas produced in the State.
Severance and first
f-.t::2-X-L L
'trv-,
not
"substantially
use--usually A
processing--were

'

equivalent

,:

event [s]"

imposed.

Id.,

wholesale

selling

event[s]"

at

on which
759.
are

that

such

compensating

Here,

too,

taxes

may be

manufacturing

not

"substantially

the

heavy

tax

and

equivalent

on

in-state

manufacturers can be said to compensate for the admittedly
lighter

burden placed on wholesalers from out of State.

Manufacturing frequently entails selling in the State, but
we cannot say which portion of the manufacturing tax is
attributable
sales. 7 A

to

manufacturing,

7k'aftlit

and

which

portion

to

manufacturing tax is not reduced when a

West Virginia manufacturer sells its goods out of state,

?

-? lA.an

..

is reduced when part of the manufacturing takes place

out of state, makes clear

that the manufacturing tax is

just that, and not in part a proxy for the gross receipts

~~-~

7 one would expect that a manufact ~
g tax might be
larger than a gross receipts tax since ) sY manufacturer
a~ y ; 1i1£Q§ 5:dB0iL~ ~€'-fie f i t.s il.J;lO services provided
by the State than does a transient wholesaler.
Cf.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977) (state tax will be upheld if it is "fairly related
to the services provided by the State").

8.

tax imposed on Armco and other sellers from other States.

8

Moreover, when the two taxes are considered together,
discrimination against

interstate commerce persists.

If

Ohio or any of the other 48 States imposes a like tax on
its manufacturers--which they have every right to do--then
Armco

and

8 The

others

from

out

of

State

will

pay

both

a

court below relied upon Alaska v. Arctic Maid,
366 u.s. 199 (1961).
That case does not control because
the statute there merely laid a nondiscriminatory tax on a
particular kind of business, operating freezer ships in
Alaska.
This was deemed a
different business from
operating a cannery in Alaska, on which a different ( in
fact, higher) tax was imposed.
See id., at 205.
There is
no dispute that Armco and the exempt West Virginia
manufacturers operate in precisely the same business of
wholesaling in that State.
That an exemption is required
to ensure that the gross receipts tax will not apply to
the latter makes this clear.
The same is true of Caskey
Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117, 119-120, 121 (1941),
a case that in any event was decided under the now
d.54'-CatdJid notion that only "direct" burdens on interstate
A commerce were disapproved, while "indirect" burdens that
were the result of taxation of intrastate commerce were
constitutional, see id., at 120, and n. 4; Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435
u.s. 734, 750 (1978).
~
~
We acknowledge th.at. ~Je.-\. r e c e ~ dismissee- for want of
a substantial federal question a case raising, inter alia,
a nearly identical challenge to the West Virginia gross
receipts tax.
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Rose,
u.s.
(1982) (103 s.ct. 32). We have not hesitated
toset aside such a precedent when the issue is given
plenary consideration.
See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 390, n. 9 (1979).
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9 what was said in a related context is relevant:
"It is suggested, however, that the validity
of a gross sales tax should depend on whether
another State has also sought to impose its
burden on the transactions.
If another State
has taxed the same interstate transaction, the
burdensome consequences to interstate trade are
undeniable.
But that, for the time being, only
one State has taxed is irrelevant to the kind of
freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause
generate.
The
immunities
implicit
in
the
Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power
of a State can hardly be made to depend, in the
world of practical affairs, on the shifting
incidence of the varying tax laws of the various
States at a particular moment.
Courts are not
possessed of instruments of determination so
delicate as to enable them to weigh the various
factors in a complicated economic setting which,
as to an isolated application of a State tax,
might mitigate the obvious burden generally
created by a direct tax on commerce."
Footnote continued on next page •
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Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946).
The court in
Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 30 Wash. 2d, at
, 192
P.2d, at 978-979, found this language dispositive in
invalidating a Washington tax scheme identical to that
here.
See also Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373
u.s. 64, 72 (1963) (deleterious effects on free commerce
of Louisiana's tax would be exacerbated "[i]f similar
unequal tax structures were adopted in other States").
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The judgment below is reversed.
It is so ordered.
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal an Ohio corporation claims that West Virginia's wholesale gross receipts tax, from which local manufacturers are exempt, unconstitutionally discriminates against
interstate commerce. We agree and reverse the state
court's judgment upholding the tax.
JUSTICE POWELL

I
Appellant Armco Inc. is an Ohio corporation qualified to do
business in West Virginia. Its primary business is manufacturing and selling steel products. From 1970 through 1975,
the time at issue here, Armco conducted business in West
Virginia through five divisions or subdivisions. Two of these
had facilities and employees in the State, while the other
three sold various products to customers in the State only
through franchisees or nonresident traveling salesmen. 1
1

The company's Mining Division mined, cleaned, and sold coal in the
State, and part of the Metal Products Division sold various construction
and drainage products through an office in the State staffed by three employees. The Metal Products Division's metal buildings were sold in the
State exclusively by two franchised dealers resident in the State. The
Steel Group and the Union Wire Rope Group had no office in West Virginia
but sold steel and wire rope through nonresident traveling salesmen who
solicited sales from customers in the State.

Y

Vv

:7 , , YJ

r

r"'

83-297-0PINION
2

ARMCO, INC. v. HARDESTY

West Virginia imposes a gross receipts tax on persons engaged in the business of selling tangible property at wholesale. W. Va. Code § 11-13-2c (1983). 2 For the years 1970
through 1975 Armco took the position that the gross receipts
tax could not be imposed on the sales it made through franchisees and nonresident salesmen. In addition, because local
manufacturers were exempt from the tax, see id.,
§ 11-13-2, 3 Armco argued that the tax discriminated against
interstate commerce. After a hearing, the State Tax Commissioner, who is appellee here, determined that the tax was
properly assessed on the sales at issue, and that Armco had
not shown the tax was discriminatory. 4 The Circuit Court
of Kanawha County reversed, holding that the nexus be2
For the years 1971 through 1975, § 11-13-2c provided, in relevant
part:
/
"Upon every person engaging or continuing within this State in the business of selling any tangible property whatsoever, real or personal, ...
there is ... hereby levied, and shall be collected, ;i tax equivalent to fiftyfive one hundredths of one percent of the gross income of the business, except that in the business of selling at wholesale the tax shall be equal to
twenty-seven one hundredths of one percent of the gross income of the
business." 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169.
The tax on wholesale gross receipts was .25% prior to 1971. 1959 W. Va.
Acts, ch. 167.
3
W. Va. Code § 11-13-2 provides an exemption for persons engaged in
the State in manufacturing or in extracting natural resources, and selling
their products. For the years at issue here, it read as follows:
"[A]ny person exercising any privilege taxable under sections two-a [extracting and producing natural resources for sale] or two-b [manufacturing]
of this article and engaging in the business of selling his natural resources
or manufactured products to producers of natural resources, manufacturers, wholesalers, jobbers, retailers or commercial consumers for use or
consumption in the purchaser's business shall not be requred to pay the tax
imposed in section two-c [§ 11-13-2c] of this article." 1955 W. Va. Acts,
ch. 165; 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169.
'The Commissioner waived statutory penalties on the disputed amount
because he found that Armco's objections were a "good faith effort to interpret a substantial question of law." App. to Juris. Statement 49a.
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tween the sales and the State was insufficient to support imposition of the tax.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the
circuit court and upheld the tax. 303 S. E. 2d 706 (1983).
Viewing all of Armco's activities in the State as a "unitary
business," the court held that the taxpayer had a substantial
nexus with the State and that the taxpayer's total tax was
fairly related to the services and benefits provided to Armco
by the State. Id., at 714, 716. It also held that the tax did
not discriminate against interstate commerce; while local
manufacturers making sales in the State were exempt from
the gross receipts tax, they paid a much higher manufacturing tax. 5 Id., at 711>-717.
We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - (1983), and
now reverse. Since we hold that West Virginia's tax does
discriminate unconstitutionally against interstate commerce,
we do not reach Armco's argument that there was not a sufficient nexus between the State and the sales at issue here to
permit taxation of them.
II
It long has been established that the Commerce Clause of
its own force protects free trade among the States. Boston
Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318, 328
(1977); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). One
aspect of this protection is that a State "may not discriminate
between transactions on the basis of some interstate element." Boston Stock Exchange, supra, at 332, n. 12. That
W. Va. Code § 11-13--2b imposes a manufacturing tax of .88% on the
value of products manufactured in the State. The value of the products is
measured by the gross proceeds derived from its sale. If the product is
manufactured in part out of State, the sale price is multiplied by that portion of the manufacturer's payroll costs or total costs attributable to West
Virginia. As relevant here, the tax is imposed on "every person engaging
or continuing within this State in the business of manufacturing, compounding or preparing for sale, profit, or commercial use, ... any article
... substance or ... commodity." Prior to 1971, the tax rate was .8%.
1967 W. Va. Acts, ch. 188; see 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169.
0
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is, a State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily
when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within
the State.
On its face, the gross receipts tax at issue here appears to
have just this effect. The tax provides that two companies
selling tangible property at wholesale in West Virginia will
be treated differently depending on whether the taxpayer
conducts manufacturing in the State or out of it. Thus, if the
property was manufactured in the State, no tax on the sale is
imposed. If the property was manufactured out of the State
and imported for sale, a tax of .27% is imposed on the sale
price. See General Motors v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436,
459 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (similar provision in
Washington "on its face, discriminated against interstate
wholesale sales to Washington purchasers for it exempted
the intrastate sales of locally made products while taxing the
competing sales of interstate sellers"); Columbia Steel Co. v.
State, 30 Wash. 2d 658, 664, 192 P. 2d 976, 979 (1948) (invalidating Washington tax).
The court below was of the view that no such discrimina.tion in favor of local, intrastate commerce occurred because
taxpayers manufacturing in the State were subject to a far
higher tax of .88% of the sale price. This view is mistaken.
The gross sales tax imposed on Armco cannot be deemed a
"compensating tax" for the manufacturing tax imposed on its
West Virginia competitors. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U. S. 725, 758-759 (1981), the Court refused to consider a tax
on the first use in Louisiana of gas brought in from out of
State to be a complement of a severance tax in the same
amount imposed on gas produced in the State. Severance
and first use or processing were not "substantially equivalent
. events" on which compensating taxes might be imposed.
Id., at 759. Here, too, manufacturing and wholesaling are
not "substantially equivalent event[s]" such that the heavy
tax on in-state manufacturers can be said to compensate for
the admittedly lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out

..
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of State. Manufacturing frequently entails selling in the
State, but we cannot say which portion of the manufacturing
tax is attributable to manufacturing, and which portion to
sales. 6 The fact that the manufacturing tax is not reduced
when a West Virginia manufacturer sells its goods out of
state, and that it is reduced when part of the manufacturing
takes place out of state, makes clear that the manufacturing
tax is just that, and not in part a proxy for the gross receipts
tax imposed on Armco and other sellers from other States. 7
Moreover, when the two taxes are considered together,
discrimination against interstate commerce persists. If Ohio
6

One would expect that a manufacturing tax might be larger than a
gross receipts tax since an in-state manufacturer normally benefits to a
greater extent from services provided by the State than does a transient
wholesaler. Cf. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279
(1977) (state tax will be upheld if it is "fairly related to the services provided by the State").
.
'The court below relied upon Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199
(1961). That case does not control because the statute there merely laid a
nondiscriminatory tax on a particular kind of business, operating freezer
ships in Alaska. This was deemed a different business from operating a
cannery in Alaska, on which a different (in fact, higher) tax was imposed.
See id., at 205. There is no dispute that Armco and the exempt West Virginia manufacturers operate in precisely the same business of wholesaling
in that State. That an exemption is required to ensure that the gross receipts tax will not apply to the latter makes this clear. The same is true of
Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117, 119-120, 121 (1941). The
latter case in any event was decided under the now rejected notion that
only "direct" burdens on interstate commerce were disapproved, while "indirect" burdens that were the result of taxation of intrastate commerce
were constitutional. See id., at 120, and n. 4; Department of Revenue v.
Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 750 (1978).
This distinction also appears to have governed the definition of the business in which the taxpayer was engaged.
We acknowledge our recent dismissal for want of a substantial federal
question of a case raising, inter alia, a nearly identical challenge to the
West Virginia gross receipts tax. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v.
Rose, - - U. S. - - (1982). We may find it necessary not to follow such
a precedent when the issue is given plenary consideration. See, e.g.,
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 390, n. 9 (1979).
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or any of the other 48 States imposes a like tax on its manufacturers-which they have every :right to do-then Armco
and others from out of State will pay both a manufacturing
tax and a wholesale tax while sellers resident in West Virginia will pay only the manufacturing tax. For example, if
Ohio were to adopt the precise scheme here, then an interstate seller would pay the manufacturing tax of .88% and the
gross receipts tax of .27%; a purely intrastate seller would
pay only the manufacturing tax of .88% and would be exempt
from the gross receipts tax.
Appellee suggests that we should require Armco to prove
actual discriminatory impact on it by pointing to a State that
imposes a manufacturing tax that results in a total burden
higher than that imposed on Armco's competitors in West
Virginia. This is not the test. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, - - U.S. - - , - - (1983),
the Court noted that a tax must have "what might be called
internal consistency-that is the [tax] must be such that, if
applied by every jurisdiction," there would be no impermissible interference with free trade. In that case, the Court was
discussing the requirement that a tax be fairly apportioned to
reflect the business conducted in the State. A similar rule
applies where the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate commerce. A tax that unfairly apportions income from other States is a form of discrimination
against interstate commerce. See also id., at - - . Any
other rule would mean that the constitutionality of West Virginia's tax laws would depend on the shifting complexities of
the tax codes of 49 other States, and that the validity of the
taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the particular other States in which it operated. 8
8

What was said in a related context is relevant:
"It is suggested, however, that the validity of a gross sales tax should
depend on whether another State has also sought to impose its burden on
the transactions. If another State has taxed the same interstate transaction, the burdensome consequences to interstate trade are undeniable.
But that, for the time being, only one State has taxed is irrelevant to the
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It is true, as the State of Washington appearing as amicus
curiae points out, that Armco would be faced with the same
situation that it complains of here if Ohio (or some other
State) imposed a tax only upon manufacturing, while West
Virginia imposed a tax only upon wholesaling. In that situation, Armco would bear two taxes, while West Virginia sellers would bear only one. But such a result would not arise
from impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce but from fair encouragement of in-state business.
What we said in Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U. S., at
336-337, is relevant here as well:
"Our decision today does not prevent the States from
structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth
and development of intrastate commerce and industry.
Nor do we hold that a State may not compete with other
States for a share of interstate commerce; such competition lies at the heart of a free trade policy. We hold
only that in the process of competition no State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in any other State."
The judgment below is reversed.
It is so ordered.
kind of freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause generated. The im- ,
munities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of
a State can hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on
the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a particular moment. Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination
so delicate as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a complicated ·
economic setting which, as to an isolated application of a State tax, might
mitigate the obvious burden generally created by a direct tax on
commerce."
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 256 (1946). The court in Columbia Steel
Co. v. State, 30 Wash. 2d, at 662--664, 192 P. 2d, at 97~979, found this
language dispositive in invalidating a Washington tax scheme identical to
that here. See also Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 72
(1963) (deleterious effects on free commerce of Louisiana's tax would be exacerbated "[i]f similar unequal tax structures were adopted in other
States").
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal an Ohio corporation claims that West Virginia's wholesale gross receipts tax, from which local manufacturers are exempt, unconstitutionally discriminates against
interstate commerce. We agree and reverse the state
court's judgment upholding the tax.
I
Appellant Armco Inc. is an Ohio corporation qualified to do
business in West Virginia. Its primary business is manufacturing and selling steel products. From 1970 through 1975,
the time at issue here, Armco conducted business in West
Virginia through five divisions or subdivisions. Two of these
had facilities and employees in the State, while the other
three sold various products to customers in the State only
through franchisees or nonresident traveling salesmen. 1
1
The company's Mining Division mined, cleaned, and sold coal in the
State, and part of the Metal Products Division sold various construction
and drainage products through an office in the State staffed by three employees. The Metal Products Division's metal buildings were sold in the
State exclusively by two franchised dealers resident in the State. The
Steel Group and the Union Wire Rope Group had no office in West Virginia
but sold steel and wire rope through nonresident traveling salesmen who
solicited sales from customers in the State.
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West Virginia imposes a gross receipts tax on persons engaged in the business of selling tangible property at wholesale. W. Va. Code § 11-13-2c (1983). 2 For the years 1970
through 1975 Armco took the position that the gross receipts
tax could not be imposed on the sales it made through franchisees and nonresident salesmen. In addition, because local
manufacturers were exempt from the tax, see id.,
§ 11-13-2, 3 Armco argued that the tax discriminated against
interstate commerce. After a hearing, the State Tax Commissioner, who is appellee here, determined that the tax was
properly assessed on the sales at issue, and that Armco had
not shown the tax was discriminatory. 4 The Circuit Court
of Kanawha County reversed, holding that the nexus be2
For the years 1971 through 1975, § 11-13-2c provided, in relevant
part:
"Upon every person engaging or continuing within this State in the business of selling any tangible property whatsoever, real or personal, ...
there is ... hereby levied, and shall be collected, a tax equivalent to fiftyfive one hundredths of one percent of the gross income of the business, except that in the business of selling at wholesale the tax shall be equal to
twenty-seven one hundredths of one percent of the gross income of the
business." 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169.
The tax on wholesale gross receipts was .25% prior to 1971. 1959 W. Va.
Acts, ch. 167.
3
W. Va. Code § 11-13-2 provides an exemption for persons engaged in
the State in manufacturing or in extracting natural resources, and selling
their products. For the years at issue here, it read as follows:
"[A]ny person exercising any privilege taxable under sections two-a [extracting and producing natural resources for sale] or two-b [manufacturing]
of this article and engaging in the business of selling his natural resources
or manufactured products to producers of natural resources, manufacturers, wholesalers, jobbers, retailers or commercial consumers for use or
consumption in the purchaser's business shall not be requred to pay the tax
imposed in section two-c [§ ll-13-2c] of this article." 1955 W. Va. Acts,
ch. 165; 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169.
'The Commissioner waived statutory penalties on the disputed amount
because he found that Armco's objections were a "good faith effort to interpret a substantial question of law. " App. to Juris. Statement 49a.
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tween the sales and the State was insufficient to support imposition of the tax.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the
circuit court and upheld the tax. 303 S. E. 2d 706 (1983).
Viewing all of Armco's activities in the State as a "unitary
business," the court held that the taxpayer had a substantial
nexus with the State and that the taxpayer's total tax was
fairly related to the services and benefits provided to Armco
by the State. Id., at 714, 716. It also held that the tax did
not discriminate against interstate commerce; while local
manufacturers making sales in the State were exempt from
the gross receipts tax, they paid a much higher manufacturing tax. 5 Id., at 71&-717.
We noted probable jurisdiction, --U. S. --(1983), and
now reverse. Since we hold that West Virginia's tax does
discriminate unconstitutionally against interstate commerce,
we do not reach Armco's argument that there was not a sufficient nexus between the State and the sales at issue here to
permit taxation of them.
II
It long has been established that the Commerce Clause of
its own force protects free trade among the States. Boston
Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318, 328
(1977); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). One
aspect of this protection is that a State "may not discriminate
between transactions on the basis of some interstate element." Boston Stock Exchange, supra, at 332, n. 12. That
' W. Va. Code § 11-13-2b imposes a manufacturing tax of .88% on the
value of products manufactured in the State. The value of the products is
measured by the gross proceeds derived from its sale. If the product is
manufactured in part out of State, the sale price is multiplied by that portion of the manufacturer's payroll costs or total costs attributable to West
Virginia. As relevant here, the tax is imposed on "every person engaging
or continuing within this State in the business of manufacturing, compounding or preparing for sale, profit, or commercial use, ... any article
.. . substance or ... commodity. " Prior to 1971, the tax rate was .8%.
1967 W. Va. Acts, ch. 188; see 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169.
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is, a State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily
when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within
the State.
On its face, the gross receipts tax at issue here appears to
have just this effect. The tax provides that two companies
selling tangible property at wholesale in West Virginia will
be treated differently depending on whether the taxpayer
conducts manufacturing in the State or out of it. Thus, if the
property was manufactured in the State, no tax on the sale is
imposed. If the property was manufactured out of the State
and imported for sale, a tax of .27% is imposed on the sale
price. See General Motors v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436,
459 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (similar provision in
Washington "on its face, discriminated against interstate
wholesale sales to Washington purchasers for it exempted
the intrastate sales of locally made products while taxing the
competing sales of interstate sellers"); Columbia Steel Co. v.
State, 30 Wash. 2d 658, 664, 192 P. 2d 976, 979 (1948) (invalidating Washington tax).
The court below was of the view that no such discrimination in favor of local, intrastate commerce occurred because
taxpayers manufacturing in the State were subject to a far
higher tax of .88% of the sale price. This view is mistaken.
The gross sales tax imposed on Armco cannot be deemed a
"compensating tax" for the manufacturing tax imposed on its
West Virginia competitors. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U. S. 725, 758--759 (1981), the Court refused to consider a tax
on the first use in Louisiana of gas brought in from out of
State to be a complement of a severance tax in the same
amount imposed on gas produced in the State. Severance
and first use or processing were not "substantially equivalent
events" on which compensating taxes might be imposed.
Id., at 759. Here, too, manufacturing and wholesaling are
not "substantially equivalent event[s]" such that the heavy
tax on in-state manufacturers can be said to compensate for
the admittedly lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out
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of State. Manufacturing frequently entails selling in the
State, but we cannot say which portion of the manufacturing
tax is attributable to manufacturing, and which portion to
sales. 6 The fact that the manufacturing tax is not reduced
when a West Virginia manufacturer sells its goods out of
state, and that it is reduced when part of the manufacturing
takes place out of state, makes clear that the manufacturing
tax is just that, and not in part a proxy for the gross receipts
tax imposed on Armco and other sellers from other States. 7
Moreover, when the two taxes are considered together,
discrimination against interstate commerce persists. If Ohio
One would expect that a manufacturing tax might be larger than a
gross receipts tax since an in-state manufacturer normally benefits to a
greater extent from services provided by the State than does a transient
wholesaler. Cf. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279
(1977) (state tax will be upheld if it is "fairly related to the services provided by the State").
7
The court below relied upon Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199
(1961). That case does not control because the statute there merely laid a
nondiscriminatory tax on a particular kind of business, operating freezer
ships in Alaska. This was deemed a different business from operating a
cannery in Alaska, on which a different (in fact, higher) tax was imposed.
See id., at 205. There is no dispute that Armco and the exempt West Virginia manufacturers operate in precisely the same business of wholesaling
in that State. That an exemption is required to ensure that the gross receipts tax will not apply to the latter makes this clear. The same is true of
Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117, 119--120, 121 (1941). The
latter case in any event was decided under the now rejected notion that
only "direct" burdens on interstate commerce were disapproved, while "indirect" burdens that were the result of taxation of intrastate commerce
were constitutional. See id., at 120, and n. 4; Department of Revenue v.
Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 750 (1978).
This distinction also appears to have governed the definition of the business in which the taxpayer was engaged.
We acknowledge our recent dismissal for want of a substantial federal
question of a case raising, inter alia, a nearly identical challenge to the
West Virginia gross receipts tax. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v.
Rose, - - U. S. - - (1982). We may find it necessary not to follow such
a precedent when the issue is given plenary consideration. See, e.g.,
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 390, n. 9 (1979).
6
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or any of the other 48 States imposes a like tax on its manufacturers-which they have every right to do-then Armco
and others from out of State will pay both a manufacturing
tax and a wholesale tax while sellers resident in West Virginia will pay only the manufacturing tax. For example, if
Ohio were to adopt the precise scheme here, then an interstate seller would pay the manufacturing tax of .88% and the
gross receipts tax of .27%; a purely intrastate seller would
pay only the manufacturing tax of .88% and would be exempt
from the gross receipts tax.
Appellee suggests that we should require Armco to prove
actual discriminatory impact on it by pointing to a State that
imposes a manufacturing tax that results in a total burden
higher than that imposed on Armco's competitors in West
Virginia. This is not the test. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, - - U.S.--, - - (1983),
the Court noted that a tax must have "what might be called
internal consistency-that is the [tax] must be such that, if
applied by every jurisdiction," there would be no impermissible interference with free trade. In that case, the Court was
discussing the requirement that a tax be fairly apportioned to
reflect the business conducted in the State. A similar rule
applies where the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate commerce. A tax that unfairly apportions income from other States is a form of discrimination
against interstate commerce. See also id., at - - . Any
other rule would mean that the constitutionality of West Virginia's tax laws would depend on the shifting complexities of
the tax codes of 49 other States, and that the validity of the
taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the particular other States in which it operated. 8
What was said in a related context is relevant:
"It is suggested, however, that the validity of a gross sales tax should
depend on whether another State has also sought to impose its burden on
the transactions. If another State has taxed the same interstate transaction, the burdensome consequences to interstate trade are undeniable.
But that, for the time being, only one State has taxed is irrelevant to the
8
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It is true, as the State of Washington appearing as amicus
curiae points out, that Armco would be faced with the same
situation that it complains of here if Ohio (or some other
State) imposed a tax only upon manufacturing, while West
Virginia imposed a tax only upon wholesaling. In that situation, Armco would bear two taxes, while West Virginia sellers would bear only one. But such a result would not arise
from impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce but from fair encouragement of in-state business.
What we said in Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U. S., at
33~37, is relevant here as well:
"Our decision today does not prevent the States from
structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth
and development of intrastate commerce and industry.
Nor do we hold that a State may not compete with other
States for a share of interstate commerce; such competition lies at the heart of a free trade policy. We .hold
only that in the process of competition no State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in any other State."
The judgment below is reversed.
It is so ordered.
kind of freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause generated. The immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of
a State can hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on
the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a particular moment. Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination
so delicate as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a complicated
economic setting which, as to an isolated application of a State tax, might
mitigate the obvious burden generally created by a direct tax on
commerce."
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 256 (1946). The court in Columbia Steel
Co. v. State, 30 Wash. 2d, at 662--664, 192 P. 2d, at 978-979, found this
language dispositive in invalidating a Washington tax scheme identical to
that here. See also Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 72
(1963) (deleterious effects on free commerce of Louisiana's tax would be exacerbated "[i]f similar unequal tax structures were adopted in other
States").
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
The Court today strikes down West Virginia's wholesale
gross receipts tax, finding tnatthe wholesale tax unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce, because
local manufacturers are granted an exemption from the
wholesale tax if they pay a manufacturing tax on their gross
manufacturing receipts. Appellant's arguments, however,
effectively rest on the h y p o ~might face if another State fev1ect a corresponoing tax on its manufactures.
Because appellants have not shown that the taxes paid by
out-of-state wholesalers on the same goods are higher than
the taxes paid by in-state manufacturer-wholesalers, I would
affirm the decision below. It is plain that West Virginia's
tax would be unconstitutionally discriminatory if it levied no
tax on manufacturing or taxed manufacturing at a lower rate
than wholesaling, for then the out-of-state wholesaler would
be paying a higher tax than the in-state manufacturer-wholesaler. But that is not the case here. Instead, a manufacturer selling his products at wholesale in West Virginia pays
a much higher overall tax rate than the out-of-state wholesaler. The Court dismisses that fact, asserting that because
in-state manufacturers formally pay no wholesale tax, the
taxing scheme is-facially discriminatory: The Court also rejects the possiblilty that West Virginia's manufacturing tax
incorporates the tax otherwise levied on wholesale sales.
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Neither of these reasons, in my view, supports invalidating
the State's wholesale tax scheme. Our prior decisions indicate that when considering whether a tax is discriminatory,
"equality for the purposes of competition and the fl.ow of commerce is measured in dollars and cents, not legal abstractions." Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 70
(1963)(footnote omitted). See also Maryland v. Louisiana,
451 U. S. 725, 756r (1981)(state tax must be examined for
practical effect). Examining the State's tax structure as a
whole, see Washington v. United States, - - U.S. - - ,
- - (1983), it is plain that West Virgina has not created a tax
granting a direct commercial advantage to local businesses.
See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429
U. S. 318, 329 (1977)(transfer tax on local stock sales one-half
the rate imposed on out-of-state sales). Under West Virginia's taxing scheme, in-state manufacturer-wholesalers pay a
tax rate of .88% on the value of the manufactured product,
while out-of-state wholesalers pay only a .27% tax on the
wholesale value. Thus, at the wholesale level at which appellant competes with in-state manufactured goods, it ~uite
likely that appellant pays much less in state taxes than any
in-state manufacturer-wholesaler. This fact, in my view,
suffices to rebut appellant's argument that the State's wholesale tax discriminates against interstate trade. Cf. Washington v. United States, - - U. S. - - , - - (1983)(federal
' Government and federal contractors pay less tax than local
contractors); Alaska v. Artie Maid, 366 U. S. 199, 204
(1961)(local fish processors paid higher tax).*
*Admittedly, because the tax paid by manufacturers is imposed on the \
manufactured value, while wholesalers pay a tax on the wholesale value, it
is theoreticall possible for appellant to pay a higher amount of tax than an
in-sta e manufac er. For this to happen, however, the wholesale value
would have to be more than three and one-quarter times the manufactured
value. In normal practice this price differential would seem unlikely. In
any event, appellant has failed to show that it in fact pays a higher tax than
an in-state manufacturer. Cf. General Motors v. Washington, 377 U. S.
436, 448-449 (1964).
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The Court also justifies its decision on the ground that if
Ohio, where appellant manufactures its products sold in West
Virginia, or any of the other 48 states imposed a manufacturing tax, appellant would pay possibly more taxes on its goods
sold in West Virgina than a local manufacturer. But appellant has not demonstrated that it in fact pays a higher tax
burden in West Virgina solely by reason of interstate commerce. The Court sidesteps that fact, however, by borrowing a concept employed in our net income tax cases. Under
that line of cases a state tax must have an internal consistency that takes into consideration the impact on interstate
commerce if other jurisdictions employed the same tax. See
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, - U. S. - - , - - (1983). It is perfectly proper to examine a
State's net income tax system for hypothethical burdens on
interstate commerce. Nevertheless, that form of analysis is
irrelevant to examining the validity of a gross receipts tax
system based on manufacturing or wholesale transactions.
Where a State's taxes are linked exactly to the activities
taxed, it should be unnecessary to examine a hypothetical
taxing scheme to-see if interstate commerce would be unduly
burdened. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington
Revenue Dep't., 419 U. S. 560,564 (1975); cf. Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 617 (1981).
The Court's analysis also elll_ploys a formalism I thought
we had generally abandoned in Complete A uto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 288-289, n. 15 (1977), where we rejected the per se rule and the administrative convenience that
attended our former holding in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951). I would apply a similarly
realistic approach to this case and uphold West Virginia's
wholesale tax scheme.
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